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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lloyd Hardin McNeil challenges the district court’s summary dismissal of his second
amended petition for post-conviction relief. In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. McNeil argued there
were genuine issues of material fact pertaining to three of his ineffective assistance of counsel
claims and thus the district court erred by dismissing them. He respectfully requested that this
Court vacate the district court’s judgment and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing on
those claims.
The State responded. This Reply Brief responds to some, but not all, of the State’s
arguments. For those not addressed here, Mr. McNeil respectfully refers this Court to his
Appellant’s Brief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. McNeil’s Appellant’s Brief set forth the statement of facts and course of
proceedings. (App. Br., pp.1–5.) They are not repeated here, but are incorporated by reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. McNeil’s second amended petition for
post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. McNeil’s Second Amended Petition
For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. McNeil argued the district court erred when it summarily

dismissed his second amended petition because an evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve
genuine issues of material fact for three ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (See generally
App. Br., pp.7–31.) Those claims were: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
investigate the victim’s recent attempt to pawn her ring (Claim 9); (2) ineffective assistance of
counsel for failing to inform the judge that a juror saw Mr. McNeil in the back of a police
officer’s vehicle during trial (Claim 14); and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
move for a mistrial after a juror was seen speaking with the victim’s uncle during trial (Claim
15).
The State responded that the district court properly dismissed these three claims. (See
generally Resp. Br., pp.7–28.) Mr. McNeil replies. In general, Mr. McNeil disputes the State’s
position that the district court properly dismissed these claims for failing to satisfy one or both of
the Strickland1 prongs to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. McNeil specifically
responds to each claim below.

B.

Post-Conviction Jurisprudence & Standard Of Review
Mr. McNeil respectfully refers this Court to the standard of review in his Appellant’s

Brief. (App. Br., pp.7–9.)

1

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
3

C.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Claims 9, 14, And 15 Because There
Were Genuine Issues Of Material Fact

1.

Mr. McNeil’s Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Investigate A
Defense To The Grand Theft Charge

On this claim, Mr. McNeil argued he made a prima facie showing of deficient
performance and prejudice. (See App. Br., pp.9–16.) Mr. McNeil filed admissible evidence with
the district court showing that he informed his trial counsel that the victim had given him the
allegedly stolen ring before her death. (R., p.343.) He averred that he told his trial counsel
specifically that the victim gave him the ring at Vista Pawn after she tried to pawn the ring in
exchange for a debt. (R., p.343.) In further support of this claim, Mr. McNeil submitted an
affidavit from a Vista Pawn employee that stated, on the day that Mr. McNeil told his trial
counsel about his Vista Pawn visit with the victim, the video of their visit would have been
available and Vista Pawn would have held the video if requested. (R., p.355.) In light of this
evidence, Mr. McNeil argued his trial counsel was deficient in failing to conduct a reasonable
investigation into this grand theft defense. (App. Br., pp.13–15.) He further argued this deficient
performance prejudiced him because, but for his counsel’s failure to investigate, there is a
reasonable probability the result of the trial on the grand theft charge would have been different.
(App. Br., pp.15–16.)
A couple of the State’s arguments warrant reply. First, the State asserted Mr. McNeil
“failed to present admissible evidence showing a reasonable investigation would have produced
the video.” (Resp. Br., p.10.) The State argued no admissible evidence showed the video would
be available after Mr. McNeil told his trial counsel about it and trial counsel had no “obligation
to investigate Vista Pawn the very same day McNeil made his request.” (Resp. Br., p.11.) The
State’s argument simply points out genuine issues of material fact to be resolved through an

4

evidentiary hearing. These factual issues on Vista Pawn’s preservation of the video, the video’s
availability at some later date,2 and the video’s contents are valid inquires for an evidentiary
hearing. But the State’s speculation does not defeat Mr. McNeil’s prima facie showing of a
deficient investigation. As outlined by the American Bar Association (“ABA”), “[d]efense
counsel’s investigative efforts should commence promptly and should explore appropriate
avenues that reasonably might lead to information relevant to the merits of the matter,
consequences of the criminal proceedings, and potential dispositions and penalties.” ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

FOR THE

DEF. FUNCTION 4-4.1(c) (4th ed. 2015) (emphasis

added); see also Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 280 (1998) (recognizing defense counsel’s
duty to conduct “prompt” investigation). A prompt investigation in this situation would require
Mr. McNeil’s trial counsel to contact Vista Pawn shortly after their meeting in order to preserve
the video. That is the proper investigation of an avenue that “reasonably might” lead to
information relevant to one of the felony charges against Mr. McNeil. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS

FOR THE

DEF. FUNCTION 4-4.1(c). Based on the evidence provided, and liberally

construing all facts and reasonable inferences in Mr. McNeil’s favor, he has established a
material issue of material fact on his trial counsel’s deficient performance for failing to
investigate.
Second, the State asserted Mr. McNeil failed to establish prejudice. (Resp. Br., pp.12–
15.) The State argued Mr. McNeil failed to present admissible evidence on the specifics of Vista
Pawn’s surveillance system, so the State can only speculate what the video might (or might not)
2

An affidavit from Mr. McNeil’s investigator (which the district court deemed inadmissible
hearsay) stated that Vista Pawn would have stored the video for forty-five days. (R., pp.230,
321.) Mr. McNeil told his trial counsel about the video on the fortieth day: Mr. McNeil and the
victim went to pawn the ring on February 18, 2011, and Mr. McNeil met with his counsel on
March 30, 2011. Therefore, Mr. McNeil’s counsel had at least five more days to ask Vista Pawn
not to destroy the video.
5

show. (Resp. Br., pp.12–14.) Mr. McNeil submits the State’s argument misses the mark. This is,
again, an appropriate inquiry for an evidentiary hearing—the extent and contents of Vista Pawn’s
video surveillance system—and it goes to deficient performance, not prejudice. Mr. McNeil has
made a prima facie showing that Vista Pawn had a video surveillance system, Mr. McNeil and
the victim went to Vista Pawn, Vista Pawn’s video surveillance system would have been
available from their visit, and thus the Vista Pawn video would verify, in some way, that
Mr. McNeil and the victim were at Vista Pawn. (R., pp.343, 355.) These facts and inferences are
sufficient to establish a duty to investigate.
As to prejudice, Mr. McNeil does not have to prove the specifics of the video to establish
a reasonable probability that, but for the failure to investigate, the trial’s result would have been
different. The Vista Pawn video may have shown Mr. McNeil and the victim in the parking lot,
entering the store, at the counter, or all of the above. These specifics are beside the point at the
summary dismissal stage. Construing reasonable inferences in Mr. McNeil’s favor, the video
would show Mr. McNeil and the victim on Vista Pawn’s property. It is probable this evidence
would have changed the outcome of the grand theft charge. With that evidence, Mr. McNeil’s
trial counsel could have developed a defense to the grand theft charge: that the victim gave the
ring to Mr. McNeil at Vista Pawn. This is significant because Mr. McNeil’s trial counsel did not
offer a defense to grand theft at the trial. Mr. McNeil’s trial counsel made no mention of the
grand theft charge in closing argument, (Vol. I Tr.,3 p.1082, L.19–p.1095, L.15), and the State
began its rebuttal with, “I guess they concede grand theft,” (Vol. I Tr., p.1095, Ls.17–18).
Moreover, the fact that Mr. McNeil did not testify at trial does not change the prejudice analysis.

3

Mr. McNeil’s citation to the two trial transcripts mirrors the State’s: Volume I contains all trial
proceedings except February 23 and 24, 2012. Volume II contains those two days. (See Resp.
Br., p.1 n.2.)
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Understandably, Mr. McNeil did not testify about the ring because his arguably self-serving
statements may not have held much sway with the jury. That defense would be much more
plausible with the Vista Pawn video to corroborate Mr. McNeil’s testimony. The strategic and
tactical decisions on how to present that defense, had trial counsel properly investigated and
obtained the video, are appropriate to develop at an evidentiary hearing. At the summary
dismissal stage, Mr. McNeil had alleged sufficient facts to show prejudice. For these reasons,
and those in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. McNeil submits the district court erred by dismissing this
claim.

2.

Mr. McNeil’s Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Inquire With A Juror
Who Observed Mr. McNeil In Police Custody During Trial

Mr. McNeil does not reply herein and relies on the arguments in his Appellant’s Brief to
distinguish his case from Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 705 (Ct. App. 2015). (See App. Br.,
pp.16–22.)

3.

Mr. McNeil’s Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Inform The District
Court And Move For A Mistrial Based On A Juror Communicating With The
Victim’s Uncle During Trial

Lastly, Mr. McNeil raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for his trial counsel’s
failure to inform the district court about a juror speaking with the victim’s uncle during the trial.
(R., pp.186–87, 347.) Upon learning of this contact, trial counsel told Mr. McNeil, “I can’t take
that to Judge Bail it will cause a mistrial and I don’t want to retry this case.” (R., p.347.) On
appeal, Mr. McNeil argued the district court failed to provide notice of its basis for dismissal
and, on the merits, he made a prima facie showing of deficiency and prejudice. (App. Br., pp.22–
31.)
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Turning first to the notice issue, Mr. McNeil submits the State’s basis for dismissal did
not give adequate notice of the district court’s basis. (See Resp. Br., pp.26–27.) To be sure, the
State argued generally that Mr. McNeil failed to meet the Strickland standard, (R., pp.245, 248),
but the State narrowed its basis for dismissal on this biased juror claim to a purported lack-ofprejudice argument. In support of its motion for summary dismissal, the State argued: “These
issues are groundless. It is apparent the jury did not abandon its role as fact finder in this case.
They returned a verdict on a lesser included offense.” (R., p.251.) As noted in Mr. McNeil’s
Appellant’s Brief, this is not a lack-of-prejudice argument. (App. Br., p.25 n.7.) The jury’s return
of a guilty verdict for a lesser included offense (voluntary manslaughter as opposed to second
degree murder) does not prove a juror was not biased by his contact with the victim’s uncle. If
the jury had acquitted Mr. McNeil, then he certainly would be unable to show a biased juror. But
a lesser included offense does not disprove prejudice. There is still a reasonable probability that
this error—trial counsel’s failure to inquire and move for a mistrial—affected the trial’s
outcome. As such, the State’s alleged lack-of-prejudice argument did not provide adequate notice
of dismissal based on the correct prejudice standard.
Moreover, the State’s argument did not provide notice of the district court’s prejudice
basis. The district court reasoned Mr. McNeil did not prove a “presumption of prejudice” as
applied to the contact between the juror and the victim’s uncle. (R., p.383.) This prejudice basis
focused on the biased juror, not the overall prejudice to Mr. McNeil’s case caused by deficient
counsel. Put another way, there are two layers of prejudice to this claim: (1) the presumption of
prejudice caused by the improper juror contact and (2) the prejudice caused by trial counsel’s
failure to act upon his knowledge of this improper contact and move for a mistrial. Therefore, the
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State’s prejudice argument in its brief in support of its motion for summary dismissal (which had
been filed two years before the district court’s order of dismissal) did not provide notice.
On the merits, Mr. McNeil submits he has alleged sufficient facts to overcome summary
dismissal. (See App. Br., pp.25–31.) An evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine the subject
matter of conversation between the juror and the victim’s uncle. On its face, however,
Mr. McNeil has triggered the presumption of prejudice due to the identity of the outside party: a
family member of the victim. The State’s conclusory argument that the issue was “groundless”
did not overcome that presumption. The district court should have held an evidentiary hearing on
this claim. At an evidentiary hearing, the district court can resolve genuine issues of material fact
on trial counsel’s knowledge of this improper contact, the substance of the contact, and why trial
counsel chose not to notify the district court if trial counsel believed the contact rose to the level
of necessitating a mistrial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. McNeil respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court’s judgment and order
dismissing his second amended petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case for an
evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 29th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of March, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

JCS/eas
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